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CRIMINAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POLICE NEED NOT PRESERVE
POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE As LONG AS THEY ACT
IN "GOOD FAITH." Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
On October 29, 1983, David, aged 10, was abducted from a car-
nival near his church. The assailant took David to an unidentified
house and sodomized him. The assailant then returned David to the
carnival and threatened to kill him if he told anyone what had oc-
curred.' When he got home, David told his mother what had hap-
pened and she took him to a hospital.
At the hospital a physician collected evidence of the attack using
a "sexual assault kit."' 2 The physician used cotton swabs from the kit
to collect samples from David's rectum and mouth. He later pre-
pared microscope slides from the small samples collected. The doctor
also took samples of David's hair, blood, and saliva for comparison
purposes. The police, on their arrival, took the kit and David's
clothes as evidence. No one examined the evidence.3 The police
placed the assault kit in a secure refrigerator at the police station.
However, David's clothes were not refrigerated.4
Nine days later, David identified Youngblood as his assailant in a
photographic array.' The police arrested Youngblood about four
weeks later. The day after David's identification, the police criminol-
ogist examined the contents of the assault kit for the first time to de-
termine if sexual contact actually occurred. In accordance with
standard departmental procedure, no tests were run to determine a
blood type, nor were David's clothes examined.6 The criminologist
1. Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 334 (1988).
2. Id. The Tuscon Police Department provided these kits to area hospitals. Each con-
tained microscope slides, cotton swabs, tissue paper for saliva samples, tubes for blood sam-
ples, and a medical report form.
3. Id. at 334-35. Evidence introduced at trial indicated that immediate testing of the
cotton swabs and the smears made from them could have revealed a blood type of the assailant
if he had been a "secreter" (i.e., one whose blood type shows up in his semen). State v. Young-
blood, 153 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 959 (1986), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
4. 109 S. Ct. at 335.
5. Id. At trial there was some question as to the accuracy of David's identification.
David was not wearing his glasses the night of the attack or when he chose Youngblood's
photo. He also later identified another man in the lineup as the assailant. See State v. Young-
blood, 153 Ariz. 50, 52, 734 P.2d 592, 594 (1986). See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct.
at 344-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. 109 S. Ct. at 335.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
placed the kit, but not the clothes, back in the refrigerator after his
examination.
Prior to trial, the state's criminologist conducted a blood group
test on the semen sample in the assault kit. The test was inconclusive
due to the small size of the sample.7 The state's criminologist finally
examined David's clothes for the first time some fifteen months after
the attack. Semen stains were found on the clothes. However, be-
cause the clothing had not been refrigerated, conclusive testing of the
semen samples was not possible.'
At trial, Youngblood denied the charges and claimed he was a
victim of mistaken identification. 9 The defense presented testimony
that proper refrigeration of the clothing could have preserved the se-
men samples for later conclusive testing.' ° The trial court instructed
the jury that "[i]f you find that the State has . . . allowed to be de-
stroyed or lost any evidence whose content or quality are in issue, you
may infer that the true fact is against the State's interest."'" The jury
convicted Youngblood of child molestation, sexual assault, and
kidnapping.
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, stating,
"[when] police permit the destruction of evidence that could [excul-
pate] a defendant. . . such loss is... a denial of due process."12 The
Supreme Court of Arizona denied review' 3 and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 4 In a six-to-three opinion the
Court reversed, stating that "unless a ...defendant can show bad
faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence [is] not .. .a denial of due process."' 5 Arizona v. Young-
blood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
7. State v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 54, 734 P.2d at 596.
8. Id. The failure to "preserve" the semen stains was a direct result of the failure to
"examine" the clothes and detect them in the first place. See infra notes 143-48 and accompa-
nying text.
9. 109 S. Ct. at 335. Youngblood also used an alibi defense. State v. Youngblood, 153
Ariz. at 52, 734 P.2d at 594.
10. 109 S. Ct. at 335.
11. Id at 338.
12. State v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 54, 734 P.2d at 596 (quoting State v. Escalante, 153
Ariz. 55, 61, 734 P.2d 597, 603 (1986)). It is unclear from the Arizona Appeals Court's discus-
sion whether the due process violation they found has its origins in the State or Federal Consti-
tution. The court also discussed, but did not base its ruling on, the police seizure and
destruction of a car allegedly belonging to the defendant. Id. at 55, 734 P.2d at 597. The
defendant was never allowed to inspect the car and it did not match the victim's description of
the car used by his assailant. Id. at 51, 734 P.2d at 593.
13. 109 S. Ct. at 335.
14. Arizona v. Youngblood, 108 S. Ct. 1072 (1988).
15. 109 S. Ct. at 337 (emphasis added).
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At common law, a criminal defendant had no right to receive
disclosure of the prosecution's evidence against him.' 6 This broad
prohibition was somewhat abrogated in later cases that allowed dis-
covery of documents that formed the basis of a criminal charge and of
chattels that required expert examination in order to explain the facts
to the jury.' 7
United States v. Burr'" first recognized constitutional limits on
the common law rule. In Burr a letter written by the government's
chief witness formed the basis of the treason charge against Aaron
Burr. '9 Chief Justice John Marshall found the letter to be material to
the defense's case and issued a subpoena duces tecum ordering the
President to turn the letter over to Burr.2 ° The court noted that our
system of jurisprudence provides for court-ordered disclosure of such
evidence so that a criminal defendant may adequately prepare his de-
fense.2' Over a century passed before the courts announced any fur-
ther decisions on the issue of discovery.2"
In response to prosecutorial misconduct, the United States
Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions in 1935 generally
regarded as the source of "what might loosely be called the area of
constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence" 23 for criminal defend-
ants. Mooney v. Holohan,24 the first of these decisions, involved a de-
fendant convicted of murder for detonating a bomb in a parade
crowd. 25 Later investigation revealed that all of the state's witnesses
had lied with the encouragement of the district attorney. 26 The dis-
16. This broad rule was first espoused in Rex v. Holland, 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248
(1792) where Chief Justice Lord Kenyon stated that to grant discovery in a criminal case
would "subvert" the entire criminal justice system. Id. at 692, 100 Eng. Rep. at 1249. See also
2 M. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES, 589-90 (2d
ed. 1985). See generally Annotation, Right of Accused to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence
in Possession of Prosecution, 52 A.L.R. 207, 208-09 (1928).
17. See Rex v. Harrie, 6 Car. & P. 105, 172 Eng. Rep. 1165 (1833); Regina v. Spry &
Dore, 3 Cox CC 221 (1848); Regina v. Colucci, 3 Fost & F. 103, 176 Eng. Rep. 46 (1861). See
also 2 M. RHODES, supra note 16, at 589-90.
18. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692d). See also United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694). See generally 2 M. RHODES, supra note 16, at 591.
19. 25 Fed. Cas. at 36.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 32.
22. 2 M. RHODES, supra note 16, at 592.
23. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 78-81 for a discussion of this case.
24. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
25. Mooney v. Holohan, 7 F. Supp. 385, 386 (1934).
26. The state's chief witness was over 90 miles away at the time of the explosion. See
Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J.
136 (1964) [hereinafter Prosecutor's Duty].
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trict attorney suppressed evidence regarding the credibility of the
state's witnesses and concealed a photograph showing Mooney on top
of a distant building immediately before the explosion.
The Supreme Court denied Mooney's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, 2S but stated that the use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution was "inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of jus-
tice."' 29 The Court also noted that the prosecutor's misconduct could
constitute state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.3 °
Seven years later, the Court cited language from Mooney with
approval in Pyle v. Kansas.3' In Pyle the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that deliberate use of perjured testimony and suppression of
favorable evidence by the prosecution is "a deprivation of rights guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution . *...32 Proof of such activity
should entitle a petitioner to release.33
In 1957 the Supreme Court again faced the issues of perjured
testimony and suppressed evidence in Alcorta v. Texas.34 The defend-
ant claimed he killed his wife when he caught her kissing another
man. This other man was the state's chief witness at trial. He denied
27. Id. See generally R. FROST, THE MOONEY CASE (Stanford Press 1968) (describing in
detail all aspects of the case and its political underpinnings).
28. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935) (writ denied because Mooney failed to
exhaust state remedies).
29. Id. at 112.
30. Id. at 113.
31. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
32. Id. at 216.
33. Id. See generally Note, Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 26, at 137; Annotation, With-
holding or Suppression of Evidence by Prosecution in Criminal Case as Vitiating Conviction, 34
A.L.R. 3d 16 (1970).
34. 355 U.S. 28 (1957). In the years between Pyle and Alcorta, the Supreme Court en-
acted Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S.
821 (1946) (enacted pursuant to authority granted by 18 U.S.C. § 688 (1933)). This rule pro-
vides for discovery in criminal cases and states in pertinent part, "[u]pon request of the defend-
ant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect ... tangible objects . . . which are
within the possession, custody or control of the government, and which are material to the
preparation of his defense .... " FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(C). In addition, the lower courts
decided several cases involving the issues raised by Pyle. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Al-
meida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952) (defendant's murder conviction overturned on
due process grounds when the prosecution suppressed the fact the victim was killed by a bullet
that did not come from the defendant's gun); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86
F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (defendant's trial characterized as a "sham" and a "fraud" be-
cause the prosecutor suppressed a hospital's written report that no rape had occurred). See
generally 2 M. RHODES, supra note 16, at 566-678 (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16); R. BER-
GER & A. KRASH, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451 (1950); Com-
ment, Discovery of Government Documents under the Federal Rules, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 122
(1950); Note, Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 26; Annotation, supra note 33.
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any romantic involvement with the defendant's wife.3 5 He was actu-
ally having an affair with the victim, but the prosecutor told him not
to admit it.36 The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's actions
violated the defendant's due process rights.3 7
Similarly, in Napue v. Illinois38 the Court reversed a conviction
because the prosecution knowingly allowed a witness's lie to go un-
corrected.3 9 The Court held that the rule against prosecutorial use of
perjured testimony applied although the false evidence only affected
the witness's credibility," and was not direct evidence of the defend-
ant's guilt or innocence.
In the Brady v. Maryland4 ' decision in 1963, the Court shifted its
focus from the prosecution's misconduct in concealing evidence to the
prejudice such concealment caused the defendant.4 2 The Brady Court
held that fundamental fairness requires that a criminal defendant be
afforded access to material evidence upon specific request.4 3 In Brady
the defendant, who was charged with murder, asked to see copies of
his accomplice's extrajudicial statements to the prosecution." The
prosecution, however, concealed a statement in which the accomplice
admitted doing the actual killing.45 Announcing "a basic constitu-
tional principle for required disclosures to defendants, '4 6 the Supreme
Court stated that suppression of evidence "favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution. '4 7 Withholding evidence tending to excul-
35. 355 U.S. at 30.
36. Id. at 31.
37. Id.
38. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
39. Id. at 272. The Court stated that "a conviction obtained through use of false evi-
dence, known to be such by the representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment .... The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evi-
dence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id. at 269.
40. Id. The lie concerned only the fact that the witness received concessions for his testi-
mony from the prosecuting attorney. The Court failed to explain how the defendant was
prejudiced by this other than to discuss the possible effect on the jury's perception of the
witness's credibility. Id. at 270.
41. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
42. See Note, Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 26, at 138-42 (discussing why the Court
shifted its focus).
43. 373 U.S. at 87. See generally Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 858 (1960). Although written three years before the decision in
Brady, this note discusses the issues resolved in Brady.
44. 373 U.S. at 84.
45. Id.
46. A. CHUTE, Due Process and Unavailable Evidence, 118 MIL. L. REV. 93, 96 (1987).
47. 373 U.S. at 87.
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pate a defendant is unjust, even when the prosecution's "action is not
the result of guile .. .
The Brady rule was criticized by some for not being "self-imple-
menting."' 49  The defendant faces great difficulty in determining
whether all the material evidence has in fact been disclosed. 0 Most
courts and commentators, however, agree with the basic safeguards of
fairness which Brady constitutionalizes and extends to state proceed-
ings."1 The task for lower courts in the wake of Brady was to deter-
mine what is "material" and "exculpatory" evidence for purposes of
the Brady rule. 2
Some confusion over the scope of Brady was cleared up in United
States v. Agurs,5 3 where Brady was read to mean only that the prose-
cution may not withhold material exculpatory evidence when the de-
fendant specifically requests it.14  Like Brady, Agurs involved
concealed evidence55 which was still intact and available for the de-
fendant's use on appeal. In Agurs the defendant was convicted of
murder in a stabbing incident. Evidence supporting the defendant's
claim of self-defense was known to the prosecution, but was not re-
vealed to the defendant because she did not specifically request it. 56
In upholding the conviction, 57 the Supreme Court identified three dif-
48. Id. at 88 (quoting Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 427, 174 A.2d 167, 169 (1961)).
49. Annotation, supra note 33, at 28.
50. See id. See generally A. CHUTE, supra note 46.
51. See Note, Prosecutor's Duty, supra, note 26, at 143-45 (the most important principles
discussed are based on the fact that the state has almost unlimited investigatory capabilities at
its disposal whereas a defendant has comparatively little). But cf 2 M. RHODES, supra note 16
(discussing reasons for opposing discovery in criminal cases).
52. In the years following Brady, the Supreme Court decided several cases based at least
in part on the Brady rule. See Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972) (suppressed witness
statements are not "material" under Brady); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (in-
formation that a witness received concessions for his testimony is "material"). However, they
failed to resolve the conflict in the lower courts as to what "material" evidence was for Brady
purposes. See Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963) (with-
holding evidence that is of "vital significance" in planning and conducting the defense is a
denial of due process); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir. 1968) (classifying sup-
pression of evidence cases into three categories with a different standard of materiality for
each). See generally Note, Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 26 (discussing the conflict in the lower
courts over what is "material" evidence under Brady).
53. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
54. The Court set out three definitions for material exculpatory evidence under Brady. Id.
at 103-12. See infra text accompanying notes 58-69.
55. The evidence in question was the victim's police record, which included convictions
for assault and carrying a deadly weapon. 427 U.S. at 100-01.
56. Id. at 101.
57. Id. at 114.
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ferent situations to which Brady applies.58
The first situation, typified by Mooney v. Holohan,5 9 arises when
a conviction is obtained by prosecutorial use of perjured testimony.
In such cases the Court said that the "conviction ... must be set aside
if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury."' Prosecutorial misconduct
and "a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process"61
justify such a result.
The second scenario identified in Agurs, and typified by Brady,
involves a pre-trial defense request for specific evidence. 62 The prose-
cution's failure to respond to a relevant and specific defense request
should seldom be excused.63
The final situation resembles the facts of Agurs.64 Noting that a
general defense request for "anything exculpatory" 65 or "all Brady
material ' 66 is tantamount to no request at all,67 the Court held that
the prosecution's duty in such circumstances is to turn over evidence
that "creates a reasonable doubt" of guilt that would not otherwise
exist.68 Since a general request gives no real notice of what the de-
fense is seeking, the Court thought the prosecution should only be
accountable for failure to produce evidence that is "obviously excul-
patory" 69 or "clearly supportive of a claim of innocence. "7 °
Further refinement of the materiality standards under Brady and
Agurs appeared in United States v. Bagley.71 In Bagley the Court re-
versed and remanded the defendant's conviction for narcotics viola-
tions because the defense was not informed that the prosecution's
58. Id. at 103.
59. 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
60. 427 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 104.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 106.
64. This is the situation where there has been no request, but the prosecution possesses
evidence that is "material" to the defendant's case. Id. at 101.
65. Id. at 106.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 112. The Court specifically rejected the standards which apply to a motion for a
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. This rule
requires a showing that the evidence, had it been introduced at trial, would likely have resulted
in acquittal. 427 U.S. at 111. However, as the dissent points out, if the omitted evidence
creates a "reasonable doubt" as to the defendant's guilt, it should also be evidence that would
have resulted in acquittal at trial. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 107 (this is the standard for "general request" situations).
70. Id. (this is the standard for "no request" situations).
71. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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chief witnesses received concessions for their testimony.7 2 The Court
also held that the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony was
subject to a "harmless error" 73 standard which requires the prosecu-
tion to show the perjury was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 74
As for the Brady-Agurs type situations ("general request," "no re-
quest" and "specific request"), 75 the Court held that the evidence is
material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, [had the evi-
dence been disclosed] . . . the result of the proceeding would have
been different. ' 76  The Court defined "reasonable probability" as a
"probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ' 77
Three years before Bagley, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal78 discussed for the first time the constitutional
questions that arise when the prosecution has lost, destroyed, or
otherwise rendered evidence unavailable. 79  The defendant in
Valenzuela-Bernal was charged with transporting illegal aliens across
the border. He claimed he could not get a fair trial because the gov-
ernment had deported some of the illegal aliens he intended to call as
witnesses. 80 The Court ruled that the defendant had to make "a plau-
sible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have
been material and favorable to his defense." 8'
California v. Trombetta8 2 is the first case prior to Arizona v.
Youngblood to discuss the extent of the prosecution's duty to preserve
evidence.83 In Trombetta defendants charged with drunken driving
72. Id. at 684.
73. Id. at 679. The Court noted this rule had its origin in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959). See supra text accompanying note 38.
74. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680.
75. Id. at 682.
76. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (the Strickland stan-
dard was formulated to determine ineffective assistance of counsel)).
77. Id.
78. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
79. Id. at 870-74. The decision relies chiefly on Brady and Agurs.
80. Id. The defendant based his argument on United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694), supra note 18 and accompanying text.
81. 458 U.S. at 873.
82. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). See A. CHUTE, supra note 46, for an excellent discussion of this
case.
83. "We have ... never squarely addressed the government's duty to take affirmative
steps to preserve evidence on behalf of criminal defendants." 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984). How-
ever, lower courts had addressed the issue on several occasions before the decision in
Trombetta. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Spalding, 719 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding prejudice to
defendant is presumed when he is not afforded an opportunity to test sperm sample taken from
rape victim); United States v. Gantt, 617 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding good faith de-
struction of D.E.A. agent's notes did not warrant reversal); State v. Hardin, 271 Ark. 606, 609
S.W.2d 64 (1980) (finding no prejudice to defendant when destruction of evidence was inadver-
[Vol. 12:99
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claimed that the state violated their due process rights by destroying
their breath samples. 84  The Supreme Court established a two-
pronged test for determining whether a defendant's constitutional
rights to due process were violated by a failure to preserve evidence.85
First, the evidence's exculpatory value must have been "apparent"
before it was destroyed. 6 Second, the defendant must be unable to
obtain other "comparable" evidence.8 7 The Court found that the de-
fendants failed to prove either of these elements.88 Four years passed
before the Court again considered the prosecution's duty to preserve
evidence.
In Arizona v. Youngblood 89 the Supreme Court relied on both
Brady and its progeny concerning the general problems of materiality
and concealed evidence90 and the reasoning in Trombetta concerning
the special problems arising from unavailable evidence.9' The Court
first determined that because the defendant had access to the lab and
criminologist reports, the hospital report, the rape kit contents, and
the victim's clothing, the prosecution had complied with the stan-
dards of disclosure required by Brady-Agurs.92
The Court emphasized that, unlike Trombetta, the State in
Youngblood did not use the "destroyed" evidence at trial.93 The de-
fendant failed to demonstrate the "apparent" '94 exculpatory value of
the semen samples and therefore failed the Trombetta materiality test
for unavailable evidence.95 "The possibility that the semen samples
could have exculpated [Youngblood] if preserved or tested is not
tent and other comparable evidence was available); Hale v. State, 248 Ind. 630, 230 N.E.2d 432
(1967) (holding negligent destruction of material evidence is a denial of due process); Trimble
v. State, 75 N.M. 183, 402 P.2d 162 (1965) (holding loss of evidence taken from defendant's
home was a denial of due process). See generally 28 FED. PRAC. DIGEST 3d, Criminal Law,
§ 700(9) (West 1984 & Supp. 1988).
84. 467 U.S. at 482.
85. Id. at 489.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The chances were "extremely low" that the breath samples, if preserved, would
have been exculpatory. Id. Further, the defendants had other methods of impeaching the
breathalyzer results. Id. at 490.
89. 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
90. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. See generally A. CHUTE, supra note 46
at 101-08 for a discussion of issues left open by Trombetta.
92. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 336.
93. Id.




enough to satisfy the standard of constitutional materiality .... 96
Although recognizing the problems presented by unavailable evi-
dence, the Court refused to interpret the " 'fundamental fairness' re-
quirement of the Due Process Clause" '97 as imposing "on the police an
undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all mate-
rial that might be of . .. significance in a particular prosecution. 98
The majority held that the police have no duty to "preserve poten-
tially useful evidence" 99 unless their failure to do so is motivated by
"bad faith."'1' "Bad faith," according to the Court, "turn[s] on the
police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the
time it was lost or destroyed."'' 1 Because the semen samples could
have been tested and the results might have exonerated the defend-
ant,0 2 the samples had no "apparent" exculpatory value at the time
the police failed to preserve them.'°3 Therefore, the fact that the po-
lice allowed the samples to deteriorate to the point of uselessness,
under the facts in Youngblood, did not constitute "bad faith.'
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,"' argued that the majority's
reasoning was too broad.0 6 He felt there may well be cases in which
the defendant cannot prove "bad faith" but in which the trial is con-
stitutionally unfair due to the loss or destruction of "critical" evi-
dence.' O7 Justice Stevens reasoned that since the police had as much
interest in the preservation of the semen samples as the defendant, 108
and that since the jury knew the State failed to preserve the sam-
ples,'0 9 but failed to find against the State on the issue," 0 there was
sufficient evidence that the defendant had not been unfairly prejudiced
by the loss of the semen samples."'I Justice Stevens therefore believed
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 337 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)). Lisenba involved
an allegedly coerced confession. In denying relief the Court stated that denial of due process is




101. Id. at 336 n.**.
102. Id. at 337.
103. Id.
104. This is implied in the Court's ruling the police did not act in "bad faith."
105. 109 S. Ct. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 339.
107. Id.






the evidence was not material and the majority should have ended its
inquiry with this determination.
In his dissent," 2 Justice Blackmun contended that "[r]egardless
of intent or lack thereof,""' police action resulting in an unfair trial
violates due process." 4 He noted that Brady, Agurs, and Trombetta
did not require the presence of "bad faith" to find due process viola-
tions for concealment of evidence." 5 Instead, their focus was "on the
materiality of the evidence .... ,6 Justice Blackmun observed that
the majority's "bad faith" standard is not a "bright line""' ' test, nor,
does it have any basis in the Court's earlier cases.'8 By establishing
the "bad faith" rule, the majority eliminates any inquiry into the
"constitutional material[ity]" '" 9 of the lost evidence.
The dissent's test in a case such as Youngblood, where proper
testing of evidence could result in complete exoneration of a defend-
ant, 20 would take into account current preservation and testing tech-
niques and the circumstances of the case.' Under this test a due
process violation would occur whenever the police fail to preserve evi-
dence they know, if properly tested, would "reveal immutable charac-
teristics of the criminal."' 22 By focusing on the type of evidence
rendered unavailable,'23 this test would allow a court to consider the
likelihood that the evidence was exculpatory' 24 without requiring the
defendant prove exculpatory content of unavailable evidence.' 25  In
other words, the dissent thought the evidence in Youngblood was, by
its very nature, "material." The majority thought, on the other hand,
112. Id. at 339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. "Brady and Agurs could not be more clear in their holdings" that "bad faith" is
irrelevant. "Nor did Trombetta create" a "bad faith" requirement. Id. at 341.
116. Id. at 340.
117. Id. at 342.
118. Id. at 341 n.5 (noting that United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) and United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) are cases which dealt with the due process implications
of a pre-indictment delay by the prosecution and do not provide a basis for the "bad faith" rule
the majority espouses).
119. Id. at 342.
120. Id. at 344. It is apparent from the facts of the case that proper testing could have
conclusively proved Youngblood's innocence (if his blood type had been different from that of
the semen sample) or conversely, implicated him (if his blood type was the same as the semen
sample).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 343.
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the type of evidence involved in Youngblood was "useful,"' 126 but
without more, 127 it could not be considered "material."
The future effects of Youngblood will probably lie in the Court's
distinction between "useful" and "material" evidence.' 28 The signifi-
cance of the distinction lies in the different treatment each type of
evidence receives under the due process clause. If "material" evi-
dence is lost, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unavailable by the
prosecution, grounds for reversal exist and "bad faith" is irrelevant. 29
On the other hand, if the evidence is merely "useful," a conviction
will not be reversed absent a showing that the prosecution was acting
in "bad faith '"'3 when it rendered the evidence unavailable. Obvi-
ously the defendant faces a difficult task in proving that the unavaila-
ble evidence is "material"' 31  and not merely "useful." If the
defendant has not seen, tested, or otherwise inspected the evidence
and it is now, due to prosecutorial conduct, impossible to do so, how
can he possibly show there is a reasonable likelihood the evidence
would have affected the outcome of his trial? 3 2 The Court apparently
avoids this question in Youngblood. "'
However, the most important questions raised in Youngblood are
what constitutes "bad faith" and how does the defendant prove its
existence? The Court intimates that mere negligence is not "bad
faith" for Youngblood purposes. 134 If proof of negligence is not proof
126. This is the heart of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent. If the
evidence is "material," then the Brady-Agurs-Bagley standards apply and the police's "bad
faith" becomes irrelevant.
127. In a case like Youngblood, where the evidence is totally useless and was never tested or
otherwise examined, it is hard to conceive of what a defendant could possibly do to prove the
materiality of the evidence. The burden the majority places on the defendant to prove the
content of something whose content is unknown and has never been ascertained seems to
contradict the idea of "fundamental fairness" and is a significant criticism of the majority
opinion.
128. "Material" evidence is evidence whose exculpatory value is known, whereas "useful"
evidence is that which has an undetermined exculpatory value. See Arizona v. Youngblood,
109 S. Ct. 333, 337 (1988) (holding untested semen samples are merely "useful").
129. This is the implicit holding in Brady and its progeny. See id.
130. 109 S. Ct. at 337.
131. See supra note 127.
132. In other words, how can the defendant prove the evidence was "material" under the
Brady-Agurs-Bagley tests?
133. The Court obviously recognized the existence of such a question when it stated:
"Whenever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous
task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown ...." 109 S. Ct. at 337
(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984)). However, the Court never an-
swers the question, but instead avoids it by holding evidence of an undetermined content is
merely "useful." Id.
134. 109 S. Ct. at 337.
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of "bad faith," will proof of recklessness suffice, or will the defendant
have to show that the prosecution acted with outright malice and in-
tentionally destroyed the evidence to hinder the defense? Moreover,
what is the relationship between "bad faith" and acts "in accordance
with normal [police] practice?"' 35 The Court gives little guidance
other than its statement that "bad faith" turns on police knowledge at
the time the evidence is destroyed.'36
It is possible the Court had its recently announced "good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule" 137 in mind when it created Young-
blood's "bad faith" destruction of "useful" evidence rule. The "good
faith exception" rule, as set out in United States v. Leon,"' provides
that evidence seized by police acting under a defective search warrant
will not be excluded from the defendant's trial if the police acted in
"good faith" in obtaining and executing the warrant.' 39 The "good
faith" of the officers involved is measured in an "objectively reason-
able"'" manner and not on the "subjective good faith of individual
officers."' 4 1 The question is confined to "whether a reasonably well
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite
the magistrate's authorization."' 42
If the Court intends for this framework to apply in Youngblood
situations, then it seems that in order to establish "bad faith" in the
failure to preserve "useful" evidence, a defendant must prove the po-
lice acted in an objectively unreasonable'4 3 manner. Based on Leon,
the inquiry would be whether a reasonably well-trained officer would
have known that the evidence should have been preserved. '4 This
analysis supports the holding in Youngblood. The police failed to de-
tect the semen samples on the victim's clothes until it was too late to
135. Id. at 336 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, and Killian v. United States, 368 U.S.
231, 242 (1961). Killian dealt with claims that investigator's notes which had been destroyed
were material to the defense. Since the investigators only used the notes for preparation of
final reports, the Court disagreed with the defendant's claims). See generally A. CHUTE, supra
note 46, at 102, for a general discussion of the point.
136. 109 S. Ct. at 336-37 n.**.
137. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See generally H. WHITEBREAD & C.
SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 24 (1986).
138. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
139. Id. at 920-21.
140. Id. at 919 n.20.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 922 n.23.
143. Id. at 919 n.20. This is the apparent converse of Leon's requirement that the "good
faith" of an officer be determined in an "objectively reasonable" manner. Id.
144. The inquiry could be whether a reasonably well trained officer would know the evi-
dence should be examined.
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preserve them.' 45 Because they were unaware of the semen samples,
the police did not realize the clothes needed refrigeration or immedi-
ate testing. In other words, the police did not reasonably know the
evidence needed to be preserved and therefore they acted in an "objec-
tively reasonable" manner in their handling of the clothes.46
However, a strong argument against this analysis exists in the
Court's explicit characterization of the police's action as "negli-
gent."' 47 This implies the police failed to do something that the ordi-
nary, reasonably prudent man would have done under same or similar
circumstances. 4 ' In other words, the police acted in an "objectively
unreasonable" manner in their handling of the evidence.'49 Yet this
was not considered "bad faith."
Another possible interpretation of Youngblood's "bad faith" re-
quirement is that grounds for reversal exist only when the defendant
proves the police, intentionally and in violation of standard police
procedure, destroyed evidence they knew was "useful."' 5 ° Under this
view, as long as the police are following standard procedure, evidence
with an unknown content or value' 5 ' may be destroyed 152 with impu-
nity. This analysis also supports the decision in Youngblood. The po-
lice did not intentionally render the semen samples useless 53 and they
acted in accordance with standard procedure. 54  However, the dis-
sent in Youngblood pointed out the problems with this analysis when
it stated that "it makes no sense to ignore the fact that a defendant
has been denied a fair trial ... simply because the police were inept
145. The clothes were not examined nor their semen stains discovered until fifteen months
after the attack. Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 335 (1988).
146. In other words, the police acted in "good faith." But see supra note 144. If the deter-
mination of "good faith" turns on the police reasonably knowing the evidence should be ex-
amined in the first place, then it appears the police acted in "bad faith" because of the delay in
finding the semen samples.
147. 109 S. Ct. at 337. Apparently the negligence lies in the police's delay in examining the
clothes and detecting the semen samples.
148. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 164 (5th ed. West 1984). See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979).
149. In other words, the police acted in "bad faith." See supra notes 144 and 146.
150. 109 S. Ct. at 337. See also supra notes 6 and 135 and accompanying text. The fact
that the police acted in accordance with standard police procedure seems to have played a part
in the Supreme Court's decision. 109 S. Ct. at 336. See also id. at 341 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
151. In other words, "useful" evidence. See supra note 128.
152. "Destroyed" in this context does not simply mean an intentional ruining of the evi-
dence, but also includes the concept of decay and ruination due to negligent handling.
153. This is implied in the Court's conclusion that the treatment of the semen stained
clothes was only negligent. See 109 S. Ct. at 337.
154. Id. at 335.
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rather than malicious."' 5
What the Youngblood Court fails to make clear is whether a de-
liberate attempt to hinder the defense is the only basis upon which a
finding of "bad faith" in the destruction of "useful" evidence can be
made. 56 Arkansas courts appear to have taken this stance. 57
In the recent case of Terrel v. State, 5 8 the defendant argued on
appeal of his rape conviction that the charges should be dismissed due
to the police destruction of a cassette tape that contained the victim's
statement to the police.'59 The defendant claimed the tape was "es-
sential to impeach the victim's testimony."'" The Arkansas Court of
Appeals held that reversal was not warranted1 6' because the tape had
been transcribed before its destruction and the defendant had a copy
of the transcription,'62 there was no showing the tape was exculpa-
tory, 163 and the defendant failed to "allege bad faith or connivance on
the part of the State."'" In light of the facts of the case, this last
statement indicates the reversal is appropriate on these grounds only
if the defendant could show the police were trying to hinder his de-
fense when they destroyed the tape. 65
The full effect of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Youngblood remains to be seen. 166 However, it appears to grant the
155. Id. at 341-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. Obviously, this is a ground for finding the police acted in "bad faith." However, the
dissent indicates the majority is incorrectly suggesting this is the only way to act in "bad faith."
Id. at 339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. See State v. Hardin, 271 Ark. 606, 609 S.W.2d 64 (1980) (finding police destruction of
an automobile, used as a getaway car in a robbery, did not constitute "bad faith"); cf Petition
of Wright, 282 F. Supp. 999 (W.D. Ark. 1968) (holding intentional concealment of evidence of
another suspect's guilt in a rape case was reversible error); Stepps v. State, 242 Ark. 587, 414
S.W.2d 620 (1967) (holding loss of a defendant's knife was not an intentional loss of essential
evidence), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (196.8); Dozier v. State, No. 86-191 (Ark. Ct. App.
March 25, 1987) (finding reversal was not warranted without a showing the state contrived to
make an informant unavailable for trial).
158. 26 Ark. App. 8, 759 S.W.2d 46 (1988).





164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. This is apparent from the discussion of the availability of the transcript made from the
tape before its destruction. See id. at 11-12, 759 S.W.2d at 48. But cf Hamm v. State, 296
Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988) (holding that the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure require
a taped confession be preserved and made available to the defendant).
166. One commentator has stated the decision "isn't going to have all that great an effect in
the real world because police routines on the handling of evidence are already established." P.
REIDINGER, Good Faith, Bad Evidence, Feb. '89 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (quoting R. Feritta, Associ-
ate Dean of the National College of District Attorneys).
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police much broader discretion in their handling of evidence.1 67 Seri-
ous questions remain as to whether the police may decide to "toss
out" evidence, when its exculpatory value is unknown or questiona-
ble, with no regard for the effect of their actions on the defendant's
right to a fair trial.
61
Lynn D. Lisk
167. One commentator has stated that the Youngblood decision is "tacit encouragement of
sloppiness" in police work. Id. at 50 (quoting Frank Remington, Law Professor, U. of
Wisconsin).
168. However, "[iut doesn't look good when the jury hears the prosecution tell the court,
'We lost that' or 'We didn't handle that piece of evidence properly' . . . . It's not in (the
prosecution's] interest to have evidence lost or ruined." Id. at 52 (quoting Matt Chancey,
Chief of the Felony Division of the State's Attorney's Office in Lake County, Ill.).
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